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Abstract
Rapid and reliable information sharing of patient healthcare information has become critical for
achieving better care with lower costs. However, such healthcare information sharing requires to be
done securely with privacy guarantees, as required by law. Among its other requirements, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires the use of appropriate access control
mechanisms to protect healthcare information. Despite these legal requirements, currently imple-
mented access control models in the healthcare domain are typically inadequate as demonstrated by
the large and increasing numbers of successful attacks on healthcare systems. In particular, current
access control models do not provide sufficient protection for healthcare systems from attacks by
insiders, i.e., authorized healthcare personnel. This paper examines how healthcare information can
be protected from unauthorized or improper use, disclosure, alteration, and destruction by health-
care providers. Using a holistic approach toward modeling access control, the authors construct a
threat model for access control in healthcare systems. The constructed model is then used to assess
the effectiveness of current access control mechanisms such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), as well as the BiLayer Access Control (BLAC) model,
which was proposed as a flexible, higher-performance replacement for both RBAC and ABAC.
21 Introduction
Information sharing has become crucial in modern healthcare computing environments; for exam-
ple, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) of 2009
encourages healthcare providers to share information for improving healthcare quality and lowering
costs. These benefits of sharing information need to be balanced with security and privacy concerns,
especially when personally identifiable healthcare information is involved. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) specifies strict requirements for the protection of such
identifiable health information. A major requirement specified by HIPAA is access control.
An access control model is typically designed to protect data from unauthorized or improper
use and disclosure (confidentiality), and unauthorized or improper modification and destruction
(integrity). Such protection can be achieved by ensuring that decisions for access requests by subjects
(users) to protected objects (data) to perform certain operations are regulated by a set of access
control policies. The access decision making process may involve the role played by subjects in an
organization or a set of identifiable attributes associated with each subject.
The increases in reported incidents of successful insider attacks on healthcare systems in re-
cent years shows that currently deployed access control mechanisms are inadequate in protecting
against such attacks. For example, in a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of more than 600 health-
care providers, insurers, pharmaceuticals, and life sciences professionals, 40% reported an improper
use of protected health information by internal parties [1]. The University of Iowa Hospitals and
Clinics reported that 5 employees inappropriately accessed the electronic health records of 13 Uni-
versity of Iowa football players [2]. Three other breaches led to the disclosure of nearly 1.1 million
records at the Utah Department of Health, Emory Healthcare, and South Carolina’s Department of
Health and Human Services [3]. Several other healthcare information breaches by insiders have been
reported [4–8]. Such data breaches cost healthcare organizations in penalties between $50,000 for
one-time violations to $1.5 million for repeat violations across all HIPAA violation categories [9].
These inappropriate accesses require a re-examination of the traditional and current approaches
used for access control in healthcare systems and how these approaches handle threats and attacks,
especially from insiders. The impact of insider attacks compared to outsider attacks, has been stud-
ied [10,11]. Some threat models have also been defined [12,13]. This paper uses earlier work in these
areas to construct a threat model for access control in the context of a healthcare system. It also
provides an initial assessment of the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) and a proposed access control model, BLAC [14], that was developed to combine
the best of RBAC and ABAC, as discussed in Section 2.1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the background in access
control and threat model development. Section 3 describes the construction of a threat model for
access control in healthcare systems. In Section 4, the constructed threat model is used to assess the
effectiveness of the current access control approaches, RBAC and ABAC in addition to the BLAC
model, on the mitigation of insider threats. Final remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 Background
This section discusses the relevant work underlying this paper and sets the stage for presenting our
work. We first present the background concepts in access control and introduce the proposed BLAC
model for healthcare, followed by related work in threat modeling.
32.1 Access Control Mechanisms
Of the different access control mechanisms in healthcare systems, RBAC is commonly used in current
systems and ABAC has been proposed as a replacement. As both these approaches have concerns, the
BLAC model was proposed to address the deficiencies of RBAC and ABAC. These three mechanisms
are discussed below.
RBAC. Access control based on RBAC [15–17] has been widely deployed in healthcare. RBAC
regulates access to objects based on subjects’ roles or their job functions, i.e., permissions to perform
certain operations are assigned to roles, and subjects are assigned to those roles. For example,
roles can be “Primary Care,” “Cardiology,” and “Neurology.” Operations can be “Read a record,”
“Add a record,” and “Modify a record.” RBAC’s benefits include its simplicity in terms of access
administration and user permission review [18]. However, due to RBAC’s lack of granularity, insider
threat is a common problem faced by organizations that implement RBAC. Roles, as typically
defined in RBAC, are not sufficiently granular to restrict data access to only the “right” healthcare
providers. For example, consider a role that is defined as “Cardiology” and is associated with a set of
permissions. Any healthcare provider holding this role would be allowed to perform the permissions
associated with the role “Cardiology.” Thus, if a patient record is authorized to be accessed by
the role “Cardiology,” all cardiologists within a healthcare organization would be able to access the
record (for legitimate or illegitimate purposes), although not all those cardiologists may be involved
in that patient’s care. Thus, the lack of sufficient granularity in RBAC, and its extensions [19–23],
may lead to improper access in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule [24].
ABAC. Another access control approach proposed to provide fine-grained control is ABAC [25,26].
Attributes are sets of labels or properties that are associated with each subject (user), object or
environment. ABAC uses attributes to define access requests and policies, for example, subject
(user) attributes within access requests are compared against attributes stated within the ABAC
access policies to determine whether to allow or deny these requests. The use of such attributes
permits ABAC to support fine-grained access control. For instance, in the example discussed above,
access to the patient record can be restricted to specific cardiologists involved in that patient’s care
as these doctor’s attributes can be included in the ABAC policy. Despite these benefits, ABAC and
its variants [27–31] still have several limitations. ABAC complicates the process of making access
decisions due to the large number of rules needed to be evaluated. For n attributes, ABAC may
require up to 2n possible rules. Also, management of privileges, user permissions, and permission
review for a particular user are difficult to perform as a large set of rules must be executed [14].
RBAC Standard Revision. Given these limitations of both RBAC and ABAC, NIST [32] called for
the development of an access control model that includes the use of attributes while maintaining the
advantages of RBAC. Three possible mechanisms have been identified: (1) dynamic roles, in which
attributes are used to dynamically assign roles to subjects, (2) attribute-centric, in which roles are
defined as another attribute of subjects, and (3) role-centric, in which attributes are used to constrain
the permissions assigned to roles. Alshehri and Raj [14] show that all these three mechanisms have
drawbacks, and proposed the BiLayer Access Control (BLAC) model that uses attributes and policies
while preserving RBAC’s advantages.
4Fig. 1. The BLAC Model
The BLAC Model. The BLAC model [14] is designed to overcome the limitations by RBAC and
ABAC discussed above, and to address the call by NIST for the development of an access control
model that supports the use of attributes and policies while maintaining the advantages of RBAC.
In the BLAC model, attributes are classified as static and dynamic based on how frequently their
values change over time. Static attributes are used to generate a pseudorole, which is a manufactured
construct consisting of a set of static attributes of subjects that resembles the concept of roles in
RBAC. Static and dynamic attributes are used in policies to constrain pseudoroles.
In the BLAC model, subjects are associated with pseudoroles and objects are associated with
policies to specify whether access requests by subjects are accepted or rejected. A policy, as defined
in the BLAC model, consists of two elements: (1) a Boolean function called PseudoRole, and (2)
a set of one or more rules. Each rule consists of four sub-elements defined as Boolean functions to
specify the range of values that must be satisfied for the subject, object, action, and environment
attributes. The BLAC model is illustrated in Figure 1.
The evaluation of access requests, as depicted in Figure 2, illustrates the two-step process used
in the BLAC model:
1. When an access request is made, the policy associated with the requested object is first checked
to see whether the pseudorole of the requester satisfies the PseudoRole function within that
policy (first layer).
2. If the requester holds the satisfied pseudorole, rules within the policy are further evaluated to
check if the access request fulfills the specified values of subject, object, action, and environment
attributes to grant or deny the request (second layer).
This two-step access control allows the BLAC model essentially to utilize the approach of RBAC
in the first step and ABAC, when needed, in the second step. The BLAC model thus integrates
RBAC and ABAC to leverage the strengths of each while not suffering their disadvantages.
5Fig. 2. The Two-step Access Control in the BLAC Model
2.2 Threat Modeling Methodologies
The other related work is in the area of threat models. Several threat modeling methodologies
exist, including Microsoft Threat Modeling Methodology [33], Microsoft Threat Modeling for Web
Applications [34], OWASP Application Threat Modeling [35], Process for Attack Simulation and
Threat Analysis (PASTA) [36], and Trike [37].
Microsoft and OWASP methodologies start with identifying assets and understanding the tar-
get application by creating use-cases, identifying entry points, and analyzing data flow diagrams
(DFDs). Next, potential threats are identified using a threat categorization methodology such as
Microsoft STRIDE model, or the Application Security Frame (ASF). Finally, identified threats are
ranked based on the security risks they pose. Risks can be determined using a simple High, Medium,
or Low scale, or Microsoft DREAD threat-risk ranking model. PASTA and Trike differ from Mi-
crosoft and OWASP threat modeling by identifying business objectives and security and compliance
requirements in the former, and taking risks into perspective in the latter. In this work, various
techniques from these methodologies are adopted to meet the need of the target system and the
identified security objective.
3 Constructing a Threat Model for Access Control
The main objective for constructing the threat model is to help improve the security of healthcare
systems from the perspective of access control. The focus of concern in this threat model is the
6protection of patient healthcare data from unauthorized or improper use and disclosure (confidential-
ity), and unauthorized or improper modification and destruction (integrity) by healthcare providers.
Patient healthcare data, as used here, primarily refers to electronic protected health information
(e-PHI), as described in the HIPAA Security Rule [38], that is created, received, maintained or
transmitted in an electronic form by healthcare providers.
The use of healthcare data is defined by HIPAA as the sharing, employment, application, uti-
lization, examination, or analysis of protected healthcare information within an organization that
maintains such information [39]. HIPAA specifically defines the disclosure of healthcare data as “the
release, transfer, provision of, access to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the
entity holding the information” [39]. The ability to carry out operations over e-PHI, including the
use, disclosure, modification and destruction, is denoted as access [40].
Access to healthcare data is classified as authorized and unauthorized based on a set of access
policies defined by healthcare organizations or healthcare laws and regulations. Authorized access in
turn can be, however, classified as either proper or improper. More formal definitions of these terms
are provided below, and Figure 3 illustrates the relationship among these access types.
Fig. 3. Classifying Access in Healthcare Systems
– Authorized access: healthcare providers have access rights to healthcare data according to
the set of security policies enforced by a healthcare system.
– Unauthorized access: healthcare providers have no access rights to the data, but have delib-
erately circumvented the system to gain access.
– Improper access: healthcare providers have access rights to the data granted to them by the
system, but have used their access to perform operations they are not truly entitled to.
As our focus is on insider attackers, the main adversaries are the authorized users, i.e., insiders,
who have some level of authority to access data depending on their identity attributes, and the
security policies developed by their healthcare organization.
In the following paragraphs, the steps to generate the threat model are presented.
1. Identifying the security objective. This step permits the model builder to focus on the
process of constructing the threat model. The main security goal of this threat model is to minimize
7unauthorized and improper use, disclosure, modification, and destruction of patient healthcare data
by insiders, based on a set of access policies defined by healthcare organizations and healthcare laws
and regulations.
2. Creating the system overview. This step permits the model builder to understand the main
functionalities and subjects of the target system. Identified here are the system architecture including
the system key components, main usage scenarios, roles of subjects, and how the system components
interact with each other and with external entities, i.e., healthcare providers. Based on the purpose
of the threat model, the identification of these items is tied to the access control.
Fig. 4. An Architecture Overview
The overall architecture of a general healthcare system implementing a generic access control
model is illustrated in Figure 4. To understand the target healthcare system fully, we develop a
real world use case from the healthcare domain to describe the main usage scenarios and roles
of subjects. In a medical center with two hospital affiliates, hospital A and hospital B, multiple
healthcare providers use a healthcare system called “cHealth” for managing patients’ healthcare data
in both hospitals. The roles of healthcare providers can be physicians, nurses, and administrative
and billing staff, in addition to system administrators to maintain the system and access polices.
Each healthcare provider is defined by a set of attributes, for example name, identification number
(ID), gender, the field of the healthcare provider, their department, and their office location. These
attributes are stored in a database.
Healthcare data is stored in another database in a file-based form that conforms to XML specifi-
cation. Healthcare data is defined by attributes, for example, patient name, patient MRN (Medical
Record Number), patient DOB (Date of Birth), and the ID of the physician responsible for treating
the patient. These attributes are also stored in a database. User and data attributes are typically
provided and managed by trusted entities, however, managing attributes is out of scope for this
paper scope. Healthcare data is organized into a hierarchical data structure: (1) demographical, (2)
clinical, and (3) billing, to provide fine-grained access control.
Typical usage scenarios are identified below to describe cHealth characteristics.
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tients who are under their responsibility in normal situations, with the exception of psychother-
apy notes.
– Physicians and nurses create, read, and modify the demographical and clinical sections for non-
patients in emergency situations, with the exception of psychotherapy notes.
– Healthcare providers do not delete data in any section.
– Administrative staff create, read, and modify data within the demographical section when they
are on duty.
– Billing staff create, read, and modify data within billing section and read data within demo-
graphical section when they are on duty.
– System administrators delete data after a predefined time of creating them.
– Healthcare providers generate access policies for the newly created data.
– System administrators modify access policies for the created data.
Healthcare providers are entitled to access patient healthcare data through their web browsers
based on their identity attributes, and according to their organizations’ policies. The interactions
among the components of the cHealth system and the healthcare providers are controlled by the
access control model to grant or deny access requests. These interactions are described in Figure 5,
and listed below.
1. Subject logs in and requests data through cHealth Web Application.
2. cHealth Web Application creates a web request and sends it to Access Decision Engine.
3. Access Decision Engine retrieves relevant policies.
4. Access Decision Engine retrieves attribute values related to subject, data, or environment.
5. Access Decision Engine makes access decision based on the access control model, and sends
access decision to cHealth Web Application.
6. cHealth Web Application enforces authorization decision: if accept, cHealth Web Application
permits subject to access and perform requested operation over requested data via cHealth Web
Service (6a). If deny, cHealth Web Application rejects subject’s access request (6b).
3. Decomposing the healthcare system. This step helps the model builder understand the
target system in detail and how the internal components interact with one another and with external
entities. The data flows and entry and exit points within the healthcare system are identified.
Figure 6 shows a high-level data flow diagram (DFD) between the system components. The
purpose of the DFD is to understand how data is processed within the internal components. The
rectangles denote external entities, and circles represent functions performed on data, or performed
on other functions based on data. The two parallel lines and curved and directional arrows indicate
databases and data movement. The curved and dashed arrows represent trust boundaries that refer
to changes in access control levels as data flows through the system.
Entry and exit points refer to the interfaces that external entities use to interact with the system
whether to send requests or to process data, or respond to requests or send data. In the healthcare
system, the login page that subjects use to log in to the cHealth Application before requesting data
access, is considered an entry point. It is denoted as the first step in the interaction process based
on the access control model illustrated in Figure 5. The cHealth main page is an entry and exit
point for all successfully logged-in subjects to carry out one or more of the usage scenarios identified
earlier. As the goal of the desired threat model is to identify threats posed by insiders, the cHealth
main page is the only point considered as it is controlled by the access control model in order for
the subjects to perform operations over data.
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4. Identifying the threats. This step permits the model builder to identify relevant threats that
may compromise our security objective indicated earlier. Generating an attack tree is a method of
representing threats against a system in a graphical or outline form [41]. An attack tree consists of a
root node and child nodes, where the root node denotes a threat, and child nodes represent various
methods to realize that threat. An outline for the created attack tree for the concerned security
objective identified for the healthcare system is shown in Figure 7.
The construction of the threat model results in effectively identifying a set of threats and alter-
native approaches used to launch these threats that are relevant to our security objective. In the
next section, access control models are assessed against the identified threats to test their efficacy
in mitigating the risk of insider threats.
4 Preliminary Assessment
In this section, we assess how access control models, namely RBAC, ABAC, and BLAC, perform
against identified threats by insiders (i.e., some healthcare providers themselves), which is the focus
of this paper. Two fundamental types of threats exist: (1) unauthorized access of information, and
(2) improper access of information; access again refers to the set of operations—the use, disclo-
sure, alteration, and destruction of data—that healthcare providers may perform over healthcare
information.
Gaining Unauthorized Access. Healthcare providers, or attackers, can gain unauthorized access to
healthcare information via several methods. Note that the same methods can also be carried out
by outsiders, i.e., unauthorized users who have no access to data but try to gain such access by
illegitimate means; however, our focus in this paper is on attacks launched by insiders.
Insiders may obtain credentials from legitimate healthcare providers who are authorized to access
the target healthcare information in several ways including:
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Fig. 6. Data Flow Diagram
– By asking for and obtaining credentials from authorized users,
– Using authorized users’ unattended logged-in machines, or
– Stealing or illegally obtaining credentials from authorized users,
– Stealing devices that contain the credentials of authorized users, and
– Stealing devices or storage that contains the target protected heath information.
In these cases, the insiders are able to break the authentication scheme being used. That is, the system
maps these insiders (attackers) to the identity attributes associated with the authorized healthcare
providers. If the attributes associated with authorized providers, along with the attributes associated
with the object, action, and environment, satisfy the policy of the target healthcare information being
attacked, the attackers (insiders) would be able to access the target information.
In other words, the strength of the access control model to guard against unauthorized access
depends on the robustness of the authentication scheme being used. Due to its utilization of object,
environment and action attributes in its policies, the BLAC model will be able to prevent attacks
as the attacker can only spoof subjects, but not these other attributes. Similar variants of ABAC
will also exhibit this property. However, in RBAC, the insider attacker is likely to have access to a
larger subset of healthcare information due to RBAC’s lack of granularity. The BLAC model and
similar variants of ABAC utilize attributes and policies, which must all be satisfied to grant access,
thus reducing the subset of healthcare information that can be threatened by the attacker.
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Fig. 7. The Generated Attack Tree
Gaining Improper Access. Authorized healthcare providers may be able to perform improper opera-
tions over healthcare information using their own credentials. Such improper access may be possible
as most healthcare systems that implement RBAC are typically regulated using the role of healthcare
providers. That is, once a set of healthcare providers are assigned to a role, all providers assigned
to this role will be assigned to the same permission set. Such an assignment does not take into
account the providers’ involvement in the treatment of each patient, as required by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule [24]. In such an RBAC setting, it is possible for healthcare providers to gain improper
access. Even the use of auditing mechanisms that may log such improper access is not sufficient
as improper access would have already occurred; the goal here must be the prevention, not the
subsequent detection.
Due to the fine granularity and high flexibility of the BLAC model and variants of ABAC
described in section 2 and detailed in [14], the set of healthcare information that providers can
access is further constrained by various attributes and a set of fine-grained access control policies.
For example, when using the BLAC model, it is feasible to specify that healthcare providers can
only access health information of patients that these providers have direct treatment relationships
with. Also, access by emergency department providers can be limited to access requests within the
hospital locations. Thus, the BLAC model would significantly decrease the possibility of improper
actions and the set of exposed healthcare information, due to the use of attributes and fine-grained
access policies.
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In summary, our preliminary analysis shows that both ABAC and BLAC have fine-grained fea-
tures that make them more suitable for preventing both unauthorized and improper access. Due
to its use of pseudoroles, as outlined in section 2 and detailed in [14], BLAC is likely to decrease
unauthorized and improper access to healthcare information, with better performance and lower
costs.
5 Concluding Remarks
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are (1) the construction of a threat model based
on a generic access control mechanism modeled for a healthcare system, and (2) the preliminary
assessment of the effectiveness of the RBAC, ABAC and BLAC access control models against the
constructed threat model.
Summary. HIPAA requires access control mechanisms to ensure the privacy and security of shared
healthcare information. The increased number of data breaches involving patient health information
caused by insider attacks in the healthcare domain proves that currently deployed access control
models are inadequate. Motivated by the NIST call [32], the BLAC model [14] was recently proposed
to address the need for fine-grained access control with performance that combines the best of RBAC
and ABAC.
Access control mechanisms can often mitigate unauthorized access by external users, i.e., out-
siders, but it is more challenging to mitigate insider threats as they already have some authority to
access data in the system. We constructed a threat model to address the security objective of min-
imizing unauthorized and improper use, disclosure, modification, and destruction of patient health
information by insiders, based on a set of access policies defined by healthcare organizations and
healthcare laws and regulations. This model was used to identify two insider threats: unauthorized
access and improper access of health information by healthcare providers. We conducted a prelimi-
nary assessment of how well RBAC, ABAC and its variants, and the BLAC model performed against
these threats.
Current Status. The BLAC model is currently being implemented in healthcare and finance settings.
In a related study, we plan to conduct a further investigation of approaches for measuring and
evaluating the performance and complexity of the BLAC model against currently used access control
mechanisms.
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